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OBJECTIVE: To examine the association between phy-
sician-reported percent of total compensation from
salary and quality of diabetes care.
DESIGN: Cross-sectional analysis.
PARTICIPANTS: Physicians (n=1248) and their
patients with diabetes mellitus (n=4200) enrolled in 10
managed care plans.
MEASUREMENTS: We examined the associations be-
tween physician-reported percent compensation from
salary and processes of care including receipt of dilated
eye exams and foot exams, advice to take aspirin,
influenza immunizations, and assessments of glycemic
control, proteinuria, and lipid profile, intermediate out-
comes such as adequate control of hemoglobin A1c,
lipid levels, and systolic blood pressure levels, and
satisfaction with provider communication and per-
ceived difficulty getting needed care. We used hierar-
chical logistic regression models to adjust for clustering
at the health plan and physician levels, as well as for
physician and patient covariates. We adjusted for plan
as a fixed effect, meaning we estimated variation
between physicians using the variance within a partic-
ular health plan only, to minimize confounding by other
unmeasured health plan variables.
RESULTS: In unadjusted analyses, patients of physi-
cians who reported higher percent compensation from
salary (>90%) were more likely to receive 5 of 7 diabetes
process measures and more intensive lipid manage-
ment and to have an HbA1c<8.0% than patients of
physicians who reported lower percent compensation
from salary (<10%). However, these associations did not
persist after adjustment.
CONCLUSIONS: Our findings suggest that salary, as
opposed to fee-for-service compensation, is not inde-
pendently associated with diabetes processes and in-
termediate outcomes.
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INTRODUCTION
Structuring compensation to improve healthcare quality has
attracted considerable attention.
1–6 However, few studies
have examined the association between existing compensa-
tion strategies and quality of care. In one study by Keating
and colleagues, physicians paid primarily by salary provided
better quality than those paid fee-for-service.
7 The associa-
tion was weak and the authors noted their findings needed
to be replicated in other settings. Another study found no
impact of a hemoglobin A1c (HbA1c) pay-for-performance
strategy.
8
A third study by Ettner and colleagues used the Translating
Research Into Action (TRIAD) database, a study of diabetes
care in managed care.
9 They noted that salary compensation,
as reported by provider groups, was associated with quality
measures, but the associations did not persist with adjust-
ment for organizational model. Ettner and colleagues_ report
used provider group surveys of physician compensation,
rather than physician surveys of compensation. The average
incentives to physicians in a particular group may not be the
same as the incentives faced by any individual physician. In
addition, physicians respond to the incentives they perceive to
be in effect, even if their perception is incorrect. Thus,
physician perceptions of incentives may more accurately
reflect compensation effects than actual compensation. Final-
ly, the analyses in the Ettner report did not examine measures
other than diabetes process measures.
In this study, we examined the cross-sectional associa-
tion between existing physician compensation strategies
and quality of care among patients with diabetes. However,
we used physician surveys to determine perception of
compensation. We also examined outcomes beyond diabetes
process measures, such as measures of intermediate out-
comes. Although conceptual models typically predict that
physicians compensated through fee-for-service will provide
more and higher quality services,
2–6,10 empirical studies to
date have focused primarily on utilization.
6,11–14 We specu-
lated that physicians receiving a smaller part of their
compensation from salary might feel pressured to provide
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448treatments and services that generated income. Such
services include injections, bone densitometry testing, and
electrocardiograms. These physicians would feel less pres-
sured to provide diabetes quality measures entailing refer-
rals, lab tests orders, foot examination, or aspirin advice.
Similarly, we speculated that degree of salary compensation
might influence intermediate outcomes by affecting the
attention paid to medication adherence. Physicians with
lower compensation from salary would have a greater
financial incentive to take on more patients, but this would
occur at the expense of seeing each patient less often,
w h i c hi nt u r nc o u l dl e a dt of e w e ro p p o r t u n i t i e st od e l i v e r
quality measures. Therefore, we hypothesized that physi-
cians who perceived a greater percent of their total
compensation from salary would provide greater diabetes
process and intermediate outcome measures than physi-
cians who perceived a lesser percent of their total compen-
sation from salary.
METHODS
Setting and Study Population
Data were collected as part of the Translating Research Into
Action for Diabetes (TRIAD) study.
15 Six Translational Re-
search Centers (TRCs) collaborated with 10 health plans
including staff model health maintenance organizations, net-
work/independent practice association HMOs, point of service
plans, and preferred provider organizations. Eligible patients
were ≥18 years of age, community-dwelling, not pregnant, had
diabetes for ≥1 year, spoke English or Spanish, were contin-
uously enrolled in their health plan for ≥18 months, used ≥1
service during that time, and could provide informed consent.
Patients varied widely across health plans, in terms of age and
race/ethnicity.
16
Data Collection
This report includes 1,248 physicians (54% physician survey
response rate) and their 4,200 patients who participated in the
2003 wave of data collection. Patient data were collected using
mailed surveys or computer-assisted telephone interviews and
medical record reviews. Multiple masked reviewers abstracted
the medical records; the interrater reliability (kappa) for the
process of care variables at each of the six TRCs ranged from
0.86–0.94.
Main Outcome Measures
The process measures indicated whether patients received
dilated eye exams and foot exams, advice to take aspirin,
influenza immunizations, and assessments of glycemic con-
trol, proteinuria, and lipid profile in the past year; interme-
diate outcomes such as adequate control of HbA1c, lipid
levels, and systolic blood pressure levels; and satisfaction
with provider communication and perceived difficulty getting
needed care. Dilated eye exam, foot exams, and advice to take
aspirin were either reported by the patient or noted in the
medical record. Assessment of HbA1c, proteinuria, and lipids
was determined through medical record review and receipt of
an influenza immunization was determined through patient
self-report. We also combined the performance of the mea-
sures into an unweighted summed composite score to
determine whether there was an association between physi-
cian percent compensation from salary and number of care
processes received.
Difficulties getting needed care were assessed by the ques-
tions, “In the last 12 months, how much of a problem, if any,
was it to get the care you or your doctor believed necessary?”
and “In the last 12 months, how much of a problem, if any,
were delays in healthcare while you waited for approval from
your health plan?”
17,18 Respondents could answer a big
problem, a small problem, or not a problem. The majority
(80%) reported no problem with either category. How well
doctors communicated was assessed with 4 questions about
the effectiveness of communication by doctors and time spent
by doctors. The possible responses to these questions were:
never, sometimes, usually, and always; “never” and “some-
times” were combined into a single category to construct a 3-
item response. Scores were summed, so response ranges were
4–12. The majority (56%) of patients had the highest possible
score of 12.
17,18 Getting needed care and how well doctors
communicated were then analyzed as dichotomous variables
on which patients had either the highest possible score or a
lower score.
Intermediate outcomes of diabetes care were the most
recently recorded values in the prior year of HbA1c, low-
density lipoprotein cholesterol (LDL-C), and systolic blood
pressure (SBP). Values were analyzed as binary variables for
patients at/below specified target levels (<8.0% for HbA1c;
<140 mmHg for SBP; and <130 mg/dL for LDL-C).
We defined a third set of endpoints where physicians were
credited with appropriately advancing treatment for each
patient if either the intermediate outcome level was at/below
target or the patient was currently on appropriately more
p h a r m a c o t h e r a p y( 2o rm o r eo r a la g e n t so ri n s u l i nf o r
diabetes; 1 or more lipid-lowering agents for hypercholesterol-
emia; and 2 or more antihypertensive agents for hypertension.)
These measures were originally created to ascertain appropri-
ate physician response (advancement of pharmacotherapy) to
suboptimal intermediate outcomes, rather than intermediate
outcomes only.
19
Independent Variables
The primary independent variable was the physician-reported
percent of total compensation from salary, modeled as a
continuous variable. The clinician survey enquired, “As a
primary care physician, what percent of your total compensa-
tion is based on salary as opposed to productivity or fee-for-
service? Fill in the blank.”
Other independent variables included physician gender,
race/ethnicity, specialty, and years of practice, and patient
age, gender, education, income, body mass index (BMI),
smoking, presence of other insurance, and type of diabetes
treatment (diet-controlled, oral agents only, oral agents and
insulin, or insulin alone) and Charlson comorbidity score.
20
Statistical Analysis
Cross-sectional associations between percent compensation
from salary and each of the dependent variables were tested in
unadjusted and adjusted models. Distributions for variables
449 C. Kim et al.: Physician Compensation and Quality of Care JGIMwere examined and missing values for covariates (but not the
dependent or primary independent variables) were singly
imputed using the transcan function in S-PLUS Version 6.1
(Seattle, WA, USA), with each covariate predicted as a function
of all other covariates in the model. When the primary
independent variable, dependent variables, or income were
missing, the individual was dropped from the models.
Adjusted models controlled for the covariates described
above, which were dichotomous except for the unweighted
summary score. To account for the clustering of patients
within physicians and health plans, hierarchical mixed-effects
linear and logistic models (SAS NLMIXED with full maximized
likelihood estimation) were used, with health plan effects
modeled as fixed effects. One implication is that all health
plan characteristics that do not vary across patients within the
same health plan (e.g., size, profit status, organizational type,
etc.) are subsumed into these fixed effects and hence are
implicitly controlled in the model. Analyses were performed
using 9.1.3 of SAS statistical software (SAS Institute, Cary, NC,
USA).
The results report the difference in predicted probabilities of
each outcome associated with a change in the percent
compensation from salary from 10% to 90% (i.e., the predicted
probability if the sample had reported 90% compensation from
salary, minus the predicted probability if the sample had
reported 10% compensation from salary). Differences greater
than zero indicate a higher probability of the outcome with a
greater percent compensation from salary; 95% confidence
intervals were calculated using simulation methods.
21
We conducted the following sensitivity analyses. First, we
examined whether estimates changed when including the
patients with missing medical records by classifying patients
with missing values for lipid, blood pressure, and HbA1c
measurements as “out of control” or as “not managed.” This
did not lead to a change in patterns of effects (not shown). We
included an indicator for the physicians who reported igno-
rance of their method of compensation and retained those
physicians in the sample. This did not lead to a significant
change in associations (not shown). We did not try modeling
percent salary compensation as a discrete variable because in
sensitivity analyses performed for a related paper,
9 the esti-
mated effects of percent salary compensation were robust to
t h ec h o i c eo fm o d e l i n gi ta sc o n t i n u o u sv e r s u sd i s c r e t e
variable.
RESULTS
The physicians in the sample had mean age of 48 years
(±10 years) and 19 years (±10 years) in practice. Twenty-eight
percent were women. The majority (57%) were non-Hispanic
white, with 29% identifying as Asian/Pacific-Islander, 7%
Hispanic, 3% African-American, and 6% as another racial/
ethnic group. Most were general internists (54%), with the
remainder identifying as family practitioners (37%), endocri-
nologists (2%), or other subspecialty (7%). Thirty-eight percent
received high (≥90%) of their compensation from salary and
36% received low (≤10%) of their compensation from salary.
Only 10% received between 10% and 90% of their compensa-
tion from salary, and 16% of physicians reported not knowing
their percent compensation from salary. There was substantial
variation in percent salary compensation across the health
plans, with percentages of physicians within health plans
reporting high compensation from salary ranging between
16% and 88%, and percentages of physicians reporting low
compensation from salary ranging between 0% and 57%.
Patients in the sample had a mean age of 62 years
(±13 years), had had diabetes for mean of 14 years (±11 years),
a mean BMI of 31 kg/m
2 (±7 kg/m
2), and a mean Charlson
score of 2.3 (±1.5). Over half (55%) were women. Forty-four
percent were non-Hispanic white, with 19% self-identifying as
Asian/Pacific Islander and Hispanic, 17% as African-American,
and 10% as another racial/ethnic group. Thirty-one percent
were high school graduates, followed by 27% reporting some
college education, 23% reporting less than a high school degree,
and 20% reporting college degrees or higher. Thirty-one percent
reported having an annual household income between $15,000
and $40,000 per year, followed by less than $15,000 per year
(30%), $40,000 – $75,000 per year (24%), and greater than
$75,000 per year (15%). Seventeen percent reported receiving
Table 1. Performance Rates of Diabetes Process Measures, Patient Satisfaction Measures, and Diabetes Intermediate Outcome Measures
Diabetes Process Measures Overall Performance %
or Mean (SD)
Range Over Health Plans
Glycemic control assessed (N=2,575) 86% 71%–95%
Lipid profile assessed (N=2,192) 73% 48%–88%
Microalbuminuria assessed (N=2,505) 84% 66%–95%
Dilated eye exam (N=3,285) 78% 66%–89%
Foot exam (N=3,554) 85% 75%–93%
Aspirin advised (N=1,924) 64% 47%–76%
Influenza advised (N=2,965) 71% 59%–79%
Unweighted sum (N=2,967) 5.5 (1.4) 4.8–6.2
Patient satisfaction measures
Getting needed care (in highest category) (N=2,990) 82% 71%–89%
Satisfaction with provider communication (in highest category) (N=2,249) 59% 50%–89%
Intermediate outcome measures
Hemoglobin A1c (HbA1c) out of control (>8.0) (N=969) 38% 23%–47%
Low-density lipoprotein cholesterol (LDL-C) out of control (>130 mg/dl) (N=492) 23% 14%–40%
Systolic blood pressure (SBP) out of control (>140 mmHg) (N=1,047) 39% 30%–50%
HbA1c controlled or treated with >2 oral medications or insulin (N=2,419) 91% 83%–97%
LDL-C controlled or treated with >1 lipid lowering agent (N=1,480) 88% 74%–97%
SBP controlled or treated with >2 antihypertensive agents (N=1,901) 83% 75%–89%
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plan. The majority (58%) were treated with oral medications
only, followed by insulin only (19%), insulin and oral medica-
tions (16%), and diet only (7%). Only 16% currently smoked.
Performance of process of care measures was relatively high
(Table 1). On average, each patient had at least 5 processes
performed, with assessment of glycemic control (86%) occur-
ring most often and recommendations to take aspirin least
often (64%) reported. Intermediate outcomes were not optimal,
whether defined as the value being under control or whether
treatment was also assessed (Table 1). The majority of patients
reported high satisfaction with physician communication and
relatively infrequent difficulty in getting needed care. The
sample size of clinicians and their patients differed for each
endpoint (Table 1), due to the different survey response rates to
different questions, the fact that not all measures were consis-
tently recorded in the medical record, and the fact that some
endpoints were obtained from either survey or the medical
record whereas others were obtained only from one source.
Unadjusted Analyses
In unadjusted analyses, high compensation from salary was
associated with measurement of proteinuria and performance
of dilated eye exam, foot exam, influenza vaccination, and
advice to give aspirin (Table 2). The effect sizes were not large,
however. For example, the largest effect was seen with advice to
take aspirin: there was only a 7 percentage point difference in
the probability of aspirin advice between physicians who
received high salary compensation versus physicians who
received low salary compensation. High salary compensation
was associated with a lower probability of getting needed care
and HbA1c control or treatment, but was associated with a
higher probability of control or treatment of LDL-C. Again, the
magnitudes were modest: for example, there was only a 5
percentage point difference in the probability of having a
hemoglobin A1c that was uncontrolled between physicians
who received a low versus high percent salary compensation.
Adjusted Analyses
Physician compensation had no statistically significant asso-
ciation with any dependent variable after adjustment for
health plan, physician, and patient characteristics (Table 2).
The primary reason for lack of association was adjustment for
clustering within health plan; we reran these models without
health plan adjustment, and this resulted in similar estimates
to unadjusted analyses (results not shown).
DISCUSSION
Literature describing the empirical effects of financial arrange-
ments on quality of care has been limited. Our findings lend
further support to previous conclusions
7,8 that there are
inconsistent associations between physician report of compen-
sation and quality of care measures. We examined a large,
geographically diverse sample that reported more frequent
performance of process of care measures than has been
reported in other studies, and we were able to perform case-
mix adjustment using detailed patient covariates.
We found that significant associations existed between
percent compensation from salary and quality measures
before adjustment and after adjustment for patient and
physician covariates. While the magnitude of the changes
was comparable to those seen in quality improvement pro-
grams,
22 the differences were small, and after further adjust-
ment for health plan, there was no significant association. This
suggests either that there was no independent association, or
that we overadjusted by eliminating between-plan variation in
compensation. We found that there was at least some within-
plan variation of percent compensation for salary, but this may
not have been sufficient to counter inflation of standard errors.
The change in several point estimates suggests that the lack of
significance for at least some measures was due to more than
inflation of standard errors, but this is speculative.
Our findings are similar to a study by Ettner and colleagues
that found associations between salary compensation which
Table 2. Regression-adjusted Differences in Process, Satisfaction, and Intermediate Outcomes when Changing Physician Compensation
from Salary from 10% to 90%
*
Process Measures Unadjusted Difference Adjusted Difference
†
Glycemic control assessed (patient N=2,441, clinician N=807) 1% (−1%, 4%) 0% (−3%, 3%)
Lipid profile assessed (patient N=2,441, clinician N=807) 2% (−2%, 6%) 1% (−3%, 5%)
Proteinuria assessed (patient N=2,441, clinician N=807) 5% (2%, 8%) 0% (−3%, 4%)
Dilated eye exam (patient N=3,427, clinician N=985) 4% (2%, 7%) 3% (0%, 6%)
Foot exam (patient N=3,427, clinician N=985) 4% (2%, 7%) 3% (0%, 6%)
Aspirin advised (patient N=2,441, clinician N=807) 7% (3%, 11%) 2% (−2%, 6%)
Influenza advised (patient N=3,407, clinician N=983) 5% (2%, 8%) 3% (0%, 6%)
Unweighted composite measure
‡ (patient N=2,431, clinician N=806) 0.03 (−0.09, 0.16) 0.02 (−0.10, 0.14)
Patient satisfaction measures
Getting needed care (patient N=3,004, clinician N=913) −4% (−6%, −1%) −2% (−5%, 1%)
Satisfied with physician communication (patient N=3,129, clinician N=913) −1% (−4%, 2%) −1% (−5%, 3%)
Intermediate outcome measures
Hemoglobin A1c >8.0 (patient N=2,125, clinician N=737) 5% (1%, 9%) 1% (−3%, 5%)
Low-density lipoprotein cholesterol (LDL-C) >130 mg/dl (patient N=1,790, clinician N=670) −2% (−6%, 2%) −1% (−6%, 4%)
Systolic blood pressure (SBP) >140 mmHg (patient N=2,217, clinician N=764) 2% (−2%, 6%) 0% (−5%, 5%)
HbA1c controlled or treated with >2 oral agents or insulin (patient N=2,199, clinician N=759) −4% (−6%, −2%) 0( −3%, 3%)
LDL-C controlled or treated with >1 lipid lowering agent (patient N=1,401, clinician N=577) 4% (1%, 7%) 4% (0%, 9%)
SBP controlled or treated with >2 agents (patient N=1,875, clinician N=683) 0% (−3%, 3%) −1% (−5%, 3%)
*Values >0 indicate that greater compensation from salary is associated with performance of the measure. Statistically significant associations are in bold.
†Adjusted for health plan, physician, and patient characteristics.
‡Estimates represent the difference between the mean unweighted composite score for patients seen by physicians with high percent salary — the mean
unweighted composite score for patients seen by physicians with lower percent salary. Confidence intervals including 0 indicate nonsignificance.
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9 Our
report differs from that report in several ways. First, we used
physician reports of compensation, rather than provider group
surveys as was used in that report. Second, we examined a
narrower set of variables to describe compensation, due in part
to the findings from that report, which found minimal effects of
the strength of incentives and utilization-based compensation.
Third, we checked for downstream effects of better perfor-
mance of process measures when we examined satisfaction
and intermediate outcome measures. However, these differ-
ences in the analysis did not lead to different conclusions, as
our reports are similar in the small associations between
compensation and quality of care. Ettner and colleagues’
report showed no association between compensation and
quality after adjusting for provider group organizational model,
and our report showed no association between compensation
and quality after adjusting for fixed health plan effects, which
eliminate confounding due to unmeasured health plan char-
acteristics.
9 Other TRIAD studies have found that a group
organizational model was associated with better diabetes
quality than the independent practice association model.
23 It
is possible that the more highly integrated models were more
conducive to clinical care strategies such as disease manage-
ment programs that have also been found to be associated
with better diabetes quality of care in TRIAD,
22 and such
models may tend to reimburse primarily by salary.
This study is cross-sectional and observational and there-
fore the associations observed cannot necessarily be inter-
preted as causal, as patients were not randomized to different
practices. Our findings may not be generalizable to other
settings or diseases. Finally, it is possible that fee-for-service
physicians would perform better than salaried physicians on
performance measures perceived to be more generously reim-
bursed than those studied here. We conclude that broad
financial arrangement strategies currently used to compensate
physicians are unlikely in themselves to be major determi-
nants of diabetes quality of care.
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